Libertarian paternalism is ‘the set of interventions aimed at overcoming the unavoidable cognitive biases and decisional inadequacies of an individual by exploiting them in such a way as to influence her decisions (in an easily reversible manner) towards choices that she herself would make if she had at her disposal unlimited time and information, and the analytic abilities of a rational decision-maker.’
It seems that libertarian paternalism combines the best of two worlds: without having to interfere with personal choices and individual autonomy, or actually even enhancing it, it simultaneously fosters better outcomes at the benefit of both the individual and society as a whole.
At least, so it seems…
Part I of this paper will examine some metaphysical and normative underpinnings of libertarian paternalism that often remain concealed. Those are:
(a) Libertarian paternalism holds the view that each individual person is endowed with two separate selves that are at odds with one another. But does it really make sense to ‘double’ the human self?
(b) Libertarian paternalism endorses the concept of a perfectly rational agent as an ideal type. In doing so, it only grants justification to those acts that fall within the scope of a perfectly rational, welfare-maximizing unit. That leaves a whole range of human choices, desires and valuations outside the scope of libertarian paternalism.
(c) Libertarian paternalism tacitly adopts a compatibilist stance in the free will debate. But compatibilism is a problematic standpoint, hence, the theoretical background of libertarian paternalism turns out to be problematic as well.
Part II will set the libertarianism/compatibilism debate against the backdrop of Saint Augustine’s compatibilist theology of the (free) will. For several reasons, Augustine’s theory already proved untenable during his own days. At the Second Council of Orange (529), a modified form of Augustinianism was adopted according to which divine grace is necessary yet not, by implication, irresistible.
Part III will argue that the Council’s canons found its most elaborate philosophical and theological endorsement in the writings of Saint Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm held that divine grace is necessary and unmerited for salvation. But for a will to be free, it must be able to keep justice for its own sake. It is thus up to the human agent himself to either accept or reject God’s justice for its own sake.
Anselm’s theory of free agency also has important axiological ramifications. Hence, it turns out that many valuable goods that are deemed ‘inappropriate’ by the criteria of the libertarian paternalist may have a certain degree of axiological importance after all.
Part IV will admonish Christians who may seek to ally themselves with the programme of libertarian paternalism. Libertarian paternalism appears as a benign way to help overcoming personal ‘cardinal sins’ such as gluttony and sloth. But is is actually the libertarian paternalist who is committed to the most unpardonable sin: superbia, or pride, which already since the time of pope Gregory the Great had been qualified as vitiorum regina – the queen of all vices.
References
Boyd, Craig A.; “Pride and Humility: Tempering the Desire for Excellence”, in Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd (eds.), Virtues and Their Vices, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 245 – 266
Kahneman, Daniel; Thinking, Fast and Slow, London, Penguin, 2011, 499 p.
Rebonato, Riccardo; Taking Liberties: A Critical Examination of Libertarian Paternalism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 293 p.
Rogers, Katherin; “Anselm on Grace and Free Will”, The Saint Anselm Journal 2 (2005) 2, pp. 66 – 72
von Hildebrand, Dietrich; Ethics, Steubenville, Hildebrand Press, 2020, 500 p. (Originally published as: Christian Ethics, New York, David McKay Company, 1953)